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Emily Post Goes to Court
Vincent S. Dalsimer*

L

come in assorted sizes, shapes and sexes. Like
judges, lawyers have varying techniques, tempos and temperaments.
Still paralleling their judicial brethren, lawyers differ in mental equipment, legal knowledge and courtroom etiquette.
Neither lawyers nor judges have the ability (or even the desire)
to do much, if anything, about their size or shape. Techniques, tempos
and temperaments can possibly be altered or at least concealed by grim
determination coupled with a stiff upper lip, but then who is dissatisfied
with his own such attributes?
In this modern day a person's mental equipment is probably much
more immutable than his sex. At any rate, most of us are smugly contented with our congenital status and not willing, let alone desirous, of
any tampering therewith.
Most of us, lawyers and judges, have some haunting, albeit hidden,
doubts concerning our legal knowledge. Fortunately, however, the Continuing Education of the Bar Program allows us to covertly learn, while
we ostensibly augment, what our unappreciated professors tried to teach
us years ago.
We come then to a consideration of that elusive collection of trivia
designated as courtroom etiquette.
After a few years of observing attorneys from the other side, rather
than the other end, of the counsel table, I have concluded that courtroom etiquette is the most rapidly declining of all of the social or professional graces. Perhaps this is because the fine points of the art are
essentially trivia. Perhaps, on the other hand, the laudable modern
trend away from the rigidity of procedure and the pre-trial sanctity of
the opposing side's theory of the lawsuit has been carried to the point
of dropping the facade of courtesy along with the penetration of the
shield of the common counts and facts generally pleaded. Certainly for
the profession to become proficient in the art of discovery, it is not prerequisite that we abandon the art of courtesy.
As alluded to above, judges like lawyers are inclined to possess
individual proclivities, propensities and, indeed, eccentricities. There
remains at all times, nevertheless, at least one marked distinction between the learned gentlemen at the bar and their erstwhile colleagues
occupying the bench: judges are almost never called upon to please lawyers; and although too many seem not to be aware of it, it is almost never
requiredof a lawyer that he by his conduct displease a judge.
AWYERS, LIKE JUDGES,
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Most lawyers have at least a fair knowledge of world and local
geography. Too few seem familiar with the territorial limits and limitations of the courtroom. There are lawyers still extant who are not
conversant with the nature of the "well," that little piece of inviolable
real estate bounded by the counsel table, the bench, the clerk's desk and
the reporter's table. Pity the poor unfortunate who in the courtroom
of Judge Thunderbolt blithely strolls into that hallowed ground only to
be reduced in a brief few moments into a withered shell by a barrage
of incisive invectives. Such a chastened young lawyer might thereafter
doubt the triviality of this particular unwritten rule. Ah, but you say
such tyranny should be abated. Perhaps it should. Some day, some brave
(and I hope wealthy) young counsel will so advise Judge T. in open
court. Meanwhile, the discreet practitioner will station himself on the
lawyers' side of the counsel table, closest to the jury box if he is plaintiff, or on the other side, if for the defendant. He will never approach
the witness nor the bench without first obtaining the permission of the
court. He will rise when addressing, or addressed by, the court unless
he is saying only a few words or is invited to be seated by the court.
If addressing the jury, he will also rise, and he will refrain from joining
them in the jury box. He will further resist the temptation to perform
acts of gymnastics on the jury box railing.
Many of our learned brethren are courtroom prowlers. They display
an inordinate compulsion to occupy every portion of the courtroom save
the counsel table, and invariably wind up stationing themselves between
the witness and opposing counsel with their back to the reporter, mumbling their questions.
The first-cousins to the prowlers are the table-tappers, the knucklecrackers, and the pencil twirlers. Probably the only remedy for these
latter is a goodly supply of tranquilizer pills, legally prescribed, of
course.
Even the manner in which some counsel occupy their courtroom
chair subjects them to the comments, restrained or otherwise, of some
of the enrobed gentry. Lolling undoubtedly has its place, but just as undoubtedly the courtroom is not that place.
Some lawyers are seemingly unschooled in the manner of addressing the occupant of a judicial office. These latter persist in "Your
Honor-ing" the judge in chambers or on the street and just as steadfastly
calling him "Judge" in open court. Whether they are perverse or merely
prone to get everything backward is not worth contemplating, but it is
noteworthy that these same devotees of malapropism invariably substitute "if the court pleases" for "May it please the court"; they "direct"
rather than "invite" the court's attention and they employ the pronoun
"you" instead of the more polite reference to "the Court."

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss2/6

2

18 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)

May, 1969

There is one select group of counsel who seldom address the court
improperly for the sole reason that they ignore the court and direct all
of their remarks to opposing counsel. Aside from the fact that such comments are usually snide, quarrelsome, or challenging, they cause some
judges to feel unneeded and unappreciated. Surely the bar doesn't desire to thus wound the judiciary.
Of course, most judges prefer to be ignored rather than interrupted.
As a matter of fact, some jurists have been known to go so far as to
interrupt the interrupter and to point out in kindly terms that such conduct is likely to be against the pecuniary interest of the initial interrupter.
Certain counsel have a penchant for interrupting witnesses as well
as opposing counsel. More than merely a breach of common courtesy,
this delays the trial and complicates the task of the already heavily burdened reporter. This is not to suggest that the occasion does not arise
where a witness must be interrupted because he is going into incompetent or prejudicial discourse. Such occurrences are comparatively rare
and are usually as quickly recognized by the court as by counsel.
Then there is the lawyer who habitually offers comment, sage, witty
or otherwise, concerning statements made by opposing counsel or the
witness. I remember one attorney who had such a practice being admonished by the judge. Thereafter, he made an extremely funny remark
which induced a paroxysm of laughter from the court. Brushing a tear
from his cheek as he regained his composure, the judge informed the
offender that he considered that to be a $100.00 joke, but that it would
cost counsel only $50.00 on this occasion.
The subject of etiquette includes for the would-be-trial lawyer the
accomplishing of the art of properly objecting to excludable evidence.
One of the first things an eager young attorney should master is the
advisability of using the magic words "I object!" Often heard in the
courtroom is a lawyer muttering something like "That calls for hearsay,"
or "That's leading," or some other such illuminating observation. At this
juncture the trial judge is frequently perplexed. He is not sure whether
he should admonish counsel for talking in his sleep or thank him for his
editorial comment.
If you wish to object, do so, and announce your decision audibly
and clearly. But be sure to also announce your grounds. Not surprisingly, unspecified grounds are not only not ruled upon but are deemed
waived. No matter how you count them, there are no more than 20 or
21 possible grounds upon which you can object. That should not be hard
to master for you nimble-witted bridge players. If when you rise you
are not certain which grounds to use, make a general objection while
you're thinking about it. Maybe your opponent will ask to be heard and
thereby extend your time. Even after the judge has said "Overruled,"
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you may properly say "I object on the further grounds that.. ." By the
way, it is always well considered to listen to how the judge rules. After
he says "Sustained," it is disconcerting to continue arguing, only to convince him to change his decision to "Overruled." Whenever the court
has ruled, etiquette requires that counsel subside unless he first receives
an affirmative reply to "May counsel be heard further?" If the court
denies such a request, it is advisable to request the right to move to
strike the answer.
Many lawyers persist in objecting to a question after the answer
is in. At this point, the court may reply "There is nothing pending."
The proper procedure of course is to move to strike the answer, "For
the purpose of objecting to the question." Of course, if the question is
not objectionable, you should move to strike the answer remembering
again that you must correctly specify legal grounds.
Although this diatribe has been directed toward the bar, it is only
fair to concede that the bench must bear a portion of the responsibility
for any laxity in courtroom etiquette or procedure. To the point that
counsel are remiss, the court should instruct or remind them accordingly, and of course courteously.
The purpose of this essay, which does not purport to be definitive,
is to advocate the practice and perpetuation of these niceties of our profession because of the sincere belief that they make life more pleasant
for the participants and engender more respect in the eyes of the beholders.
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